

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

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FULL TEXT

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.: Mr. Andreas Papandreu --
did I get that wrong?

ANDREAS PAPANDREOU: No, it's okay.

BUCKLEY: Sorry. Was an American citizen for a while. He was automatically given citizenship when he served in our armed forces during the Second World War. And in any case he had attended Harvard University and gone on to do graduate work in economics. In fact, he became a professor of economics and headed the department at the University of California at Berkeley, when suddenly he felt the call of Greek politics, ditched it all, and went back to Athens in 1959. A few years later he was a minister in his father's cabinet and the leading Greek noncommunist leftist.

But late one night in April, five years ago, a group of colonels staged a coup and democratic government, once again, was terminated in Greece. Mr. Papandreu was kept in prison for about eight months and then released.

He is once again a professor of economics, this time at York University in Toronto. He has written a book about his experiences in Greek politics, Democracy at Gunpoint, and has another book coming out on what he calls "creative capitalism".

Meanwhile he continues to apply such pressures as he can against the government of the colonels. He is particularly active in the lobby that seeks to influence Congress and the White House to put pressure on the colonels to democratize their government. Which seeks also to deprive the Greeks of military aid in the event that they do not do our bidding.

I should like to ask, Mr. Papandreu, do you believe that the United States government should deny economic or military aid to all nondemocratic powers?

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PAPANDREOU: I do not believe that it is for me to judge what should the American government do.

BUCKLEY: Are you -- you're not an American citizen now, are you?

PAPANDREOU: No. I am speaking here as a Greek. And when I plead a cause in the United States, I plead this cause because the government of the United States has decisive influence on the fate of my country.

Of course, as a democrat, and as a man who identifies himself with the cause of the people and of freedom, of open society, I stand against militarism in all its forms. And I consider indeed that most of the military programs, east and west, east and west, have undermined our freedoms, have sapped the strength of our societies, and sooner or later will bring us to the brink of another massive confrontation.

On the question of Greece, the main reason that we take such a strong stand on the question of military aid is simply the fact that the only source of strength of this junta, as we call it, junta, junta in Greece is not its popular appeal or its popular base but the armed forces. And the armed forces themselves are very much integrated into NATO, into the structure of command that has its apex at the Pentagon.

Now, the cutting off of military aid would have a fantastic symbolic significance. It would mean that the one source of support that permits them to oppress people in a brutal way, that one source of support is cut off. And it would be a signal to the Greek officer corps that the Pentagon and NATO, of which they feel very strongly to be a part, no longer approves of what is happening in Greece.

I remember, if I may off the cuff say, that Robert Kennedy, on the very day he went to television to announce his candidacy, asked me what would it -- what would do it in Greece? What single action might do it, topple the colonels? And I said to him, "Cutting off military aid". And he took that stand publicly, not only privately. And there of course many Senators and many Congressmen who have taken such a stance. Indeed Congress as a whole has. Were it not for the fact that it has been overruled by the President, this might have come about.

BUCKLEY: Now, you've covered a lot of ground. And I'm very anxious to hear more on some of the points that you have raised. But for instance, I have heard it said that the kind of military aid that the colonels primarily desire is the kind of aid that would be useful to Greece by no means in increasing their powers of suppressing their own people but would be extremely useful in the -- defending the Greek frontier against a possible invasion from a superpower.

As somebody said, "Look, it doesn't matter if you have a World War II tank to keep the citizens of Athens in line, but a World War II tank would not stop the kind of modern equipment that the Soviet Union is in a position to advance." Now, how do you handle that particular argument?

PAPANDREOU: Well, I shall give you the answer that Secretary of Defense McNamara gave to me when I put the question to him in June of 1964. He made it very clear he did not expect Greece to really be able to hold the line for more than a few days, and that -- made it also very clear, in case of such a confrontation, that the main -- well, the main burden of the confrontation would be -- in such kind of war, would be yours, would be -- fall on the shoulders of the U.S.

It is for me inconceivable that the Greek armed forces, 150,000 strong, could do much more than delay for a few days a well-designed attack in the context of a world war. I'm not talking about police actions.

BUCKLEY: How well did you do against the Nazis?

PAPANDREOU: Beautifully.

BUCKLEY: Well, why couldn't you do well against the Russians?

PAPANDREOU: Well, against the Nazis we held five days.

BUCKLEY: You call that beautifully?

PAPANDREOU: No. I was talking about the Fascists. You see, Nazis and Fascists in my mind sometimes get a little confused. The Fascists, Mussolini's forces, were not only held at bay but practically thrown into the Ionian Sea. And Hitler had to come down, in fact delay his whole schedule for attack in the east in order to confront the literally practically unarmed soldiers. Not very different from Vietnam, by the way. When there is soul in a struggle the arms may be quite incapable of...

BUCKLEY: Are you suggesting there wouldn't be soul in the struggle against the Soviet Union?

PAPANDREOU: I am not suggesting that. I think there would be soul in Greece in the struggle against any occupation force, whether it wears red, blue, green, or white colors. And this is why we are fighting against -- today -- against what we consider to be a military occupation of Greece, not an internal dictatorship.

BUCKLEY: Yes.

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PAPANDREOU: A military occupation of Greece by NATO and under the general guidance of the Pentagon.

BUCKLEY: Well, you -- you -- but you're not suggesting, are you, that if we were to stop military aid, there wouldn't be enough gun powder...

PAPANDREOU: No.

BUCKLEY: ...for the junta there to continue to stay in charge, would you?

PAPANDREOU: No. Not at all. No, not at all. You're quite right. Our argument -- by the way, you do know an important fact that Greece is a very chosen instrumentality in the military and for the Pentagon and that they are now the recipients of 30 Phantoms, highly prized possessions by any ally. But I don't think they lack bullets to kill Greeks.

BUCKLEY: So -- so therefore...

PAPANDREOU: I think...

BUCKLEY: ...we are talking about...

PAPANDREOU: No.

BUCKLEY: Excuse me?

PAPANDREOU: No. You're quite right. I mean no, I confirm what you say. The act is symbolic. That is to say, it is not in fact those guns that are essential, the additional guns that are essential to hold the situation in hand. It is a deeper question. That is to say, were it the fact, were it the case, that the administration, the government of the United States to say we cut off military aid because this is an oppressive regime, because these would be the grounds of course; it's neo-fascist regime.

BUCKLEY: Should we cut off military aid to Yugoslavia?

PAPANDREOU: Well, let me finish my sentence.

BUCKLEY: Yes.

PAPANDREOU: Now, let's consider Yugoslavia and how much aid it is getting.

For it to do that, your government, it would then say to the Greek officer "The Western alliance does not approve of fascist regimes" -- of the Portugals, of the Spains, of the Turkeys, of the Irans, and of the Greeces -- "and in this climate you officers have to choose between supporting this regime and losing your membership in the alliance of the free world or

really dumping this regime and becoming and staying as members of a truly free world military community".

BUCKLEY: Right. Okay, now let me get into that, but first of all let me ask you this. When McNamara was talking to you in 1964 did he tell you for how long West Germany would be able to withstand, let's say, a blitzkreig mounted by 95 Soviet positions?

PAPANDREOU: No, sir. Naturally not. The only question I was authorized to talk about was Greece.

BUCKLEY: Uh huh. Because I've heard that estimated at two or three days.

PAPANDREOU: Yes.

BUCKLEY: But I -- don't we -- don't we agree that notwithstanding our recognition of force majeure, of superior Soviet Power, it is also a symbol that NATO seeks in sending tanks, whatever, to Greece or to Italy or to West Germany on the basis of which to hold the NATO line. So that even a couple of days might be significant.

PAPANDREOU: Yes. But really I don't -- I don't honestly believe that is the issue. And I don't believe it because the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe proper have made a accommodation which has been more or less confirmed now and consolidated by the ostpolitik of Chancellor Brandt. Actually there is a freeze in Europe. Greece is becoming an American outpost. There are 13 military establishments now. Piraeus, the port facility, has been extended now to the Sixth Fleet.

The main reason for this is the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. There is oil in the Middle East. There is the Arab-Israeli conflict. And it is essential for the United States military to have a staging base from which to operate. And while this can be -- may be said to be very good short run, hard headed, military technocratic thinking, one can really ask the question about the long run, the kind of long run that you are facing in the Vietnams of the world.

BUCKLEY: Well, now you speak as a Greek, and I...

PAPANDREOU: I have to.

BUCKLEY: Of course. And I can perfectly well understand your desire in behalf of Greece to influence the policies of the western world in such a way as uniquely to enhance the best interests of Greece. However, two subquestions. I of course need to question you as an American.

PAPANDREOU: Of course, of course.

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BUCKLEY: And there are an awful lot of Greeks who do not share your particular enthusiasm...

PAPANDREOU: Surely.

BUCKLEY: ...for doing this and who are very much puzzled in the light of your stated preferences for democratic government that you should pool your resources with Bulakis, a communist, and make common cause with him to try to restore order to a country that was very nearly done under by communist subversion over a period of four bloody years after the Second World War. Now, is this easy to understand on purely tactical grounds?

PAPANDREOU: It's very easy to understand. First of all, in terms of the facts, I think it's important to mention...

BUCKLEY: Yes..

PAPANDREOU: ...that the agreement is an agreement of year 1968 summer. And that agreement relates not to two political parties -- these distinctions are hard to understand in a society which is not experiencing, of course, dictatorship, suppression of parliamentary procedures and democratic freedoms. This is not an agreement between two parties. It is an agreement between two resistance organizations which have nothing to do with party politics. The agreement is tactical to the extent that it is viable and valid today. This is not too important a question. It is an agreement as to the manner in which we shall actively combat in Greece the occupation forces we see. To us it doesn't differ much from the presence of the Nazis in Greece. Memories are the same. Of course it's true we don't have mass executions. But we have tortures on mass scale. And we've had imprisonments and complete death of all kinds of personal freedom and human dignity.

BUCKLEY: Mr. Sulzberger says there are 100 political figures in prison. Is that an underexaggeration?

PAPANDREOU: Mr. Sulzberger is a specialist in this. Actually, taking not my figures, because my figures could be biased and, you know, I'm -- I'm a partisan...

BUCKLEY: Yes.

PAPANDREOU: I have a cause. I believe in my country. And I shall fight for it. But taking the numbers of Ronald Steel, say, in The New York Review of Books, there were 30,000 Greeks that had been in jail at the end of the first year of the coup...

BUCKLEY: How many before the coup?

PAPANDREOU: Well, it depends what year you're looking at.

BUCKLEY: Well, the year before.

PAPANDREOU: The year before the coup I don't think we had more than -- no political prisoners -- but there must have been maybe 20, 30, I cannot be exact, people committed for actually homicide, not political crimes, but homicide that was connected to political meanings. And in fact our government, the government of George Papandreou, put an end to the shameful period, this garrison state that we had in Greece, which gave a lot of economic growth but really at the same time combined it with substantial police...

BUCKLEY: That was Karamanlis's (?) fault?

PAPANDREOU: Yes. Well, fault? Whose fault? History's fault. The fact that there had been a civil war in Greece was not Karamanlis's fault. It was the fault of many forces, the Soviet Union, the British, the communist party, the Nazi collaborators. You know, who knows who's at fault? All of them jointly.

But there'd been a miserable civil war in Greece that ended after the Truman Doctrine with substantial American participation, not in the field, but financial participation, three to four billion dollars on the whole, ended in 1949 and in the defeat of the communist insurgents, the Aomalas (?) forces. And during the next decade, 14, 15 years, we had in Greece something of a garrison state. Democracy, yes. The parliament always functioned, by the way, even when the communist forces were on top of us, practically in Athens, the parliament functioned. This is a very very substantial difference from today when there was no communist danger in Greece of any kind, the communist party being very small and very nonmilitant and very European in style. We were the danger in Greece this time. And we represented 53 percent of the Greek people. And that is why a dictatorship was necessary to suppress not us but the Greek people.

BUCKLEY: Well, now that gets us...

PAPANDREOU: Sorry about the speech.

BUCKLEY: That's all right, that's all right. That gets a little bit complicated because I know that your father's party came in with 53 percent of the vote. But it was also dismissed from power a year later as the result of an argument with the...

PAPANDREOU: A year and a half.

BUCKLEY: ...with the king. Year and a half, yes. And then there were five caretaker governments. And then there was a period during which you were denouncing your father's

policies, and he was offering support of a particular caretaker government. And a lot of rightwingers got all excited because you were questioning the fidelity to NATO of Greece. And in fact you are on record in your own book as admitting that perhaps if it hadn't been that you decided to stop teaching economics in California, Greek -- the Greeks would have a parliament right now.

PAPANDREOU: Well, that's a bit arrogant. I'm not sure if I put it that way. I'm not sure I'm that important. But let me -- let me say this. You've said many things.

BUCKLEY: Yes.

PAPANDREOU: And some of them are valid, and some of them not quite. Not intentionally. I never during the period of my political life in Greece had stated that Greece ought to be pulled out of NATO or that NATO should be -- should leave Greece.

BUCKLEY: Uh huh.

PAPANDREOU: What I did say was that Greece belonged to the Greeks, that Greece was an ally but not a satellite. We didn't want to be Washington's Bulgaria, or even Czechoslovakia.

BUCKLEY: And who did want that?

PAPANDREOU: Well, I'm afraid your generals did.

BUCKLEY: Well, I -- let's assume it a minute, but what Greek politician wanted that.

PAPANDREOU: Oh, most were afraid that without -- I'm not prepared to name names, but I would say that -- well, I shall give one example but I -- I hate -- I won't mention the name, because I respect today everyone who's fighting this regime -- but there has been a Prime Minister in the history of Greece who when General Van Fleet stepped down in the airport of Illinikon (?) turned his hand and showed the Greek troops, and he said, "General, here are your troops."

I would never have shown the Greek troops to any general of a foreign nation, allied or not, and say to him "here are your troops". Thieu will do this.

BUCKLEY: Well, that's just a form of hospitality, isn't it?

PAPANDREOU: But not -- well, not the kind that I would buy.

BUCKLEY: After all, Eisenhower managed the movements of a lot of Greek and French...

PAPANDREOU: He did. By common consent.

BUCKLEY: ...and -- well, yes. Uh huh.

PAPANDREOU: And he did not think of a French officer as being an American officer.

BUCKLEY: No. But he was simply given the -- Van Fleet was given the job of heading up the counter-insurgency...

PAPANDREOU: Yes.

BUCKLEY: ...movement, and simply did rather well. He also left. I'm -- I'm...

PAPANDREOU: Well, you understand...

BUCKLEY: I am aware that your...

PAPANDREOU: ...that my point is a moral point.

BUCKLEY: Well...

PAPANDREOU: It's a moral point.

BUCKLEY: Once again it's a symbolic point, isn't it?

PAPANDREOU: But life is -- what is life but a series of symbols? Really, in the end, what are we about -- for bread alone?

BUCKLEY: No, I don't think so. I don't think so. But I do -- I do think that it is probably instructive, isn't it, to dwell for a moment on the rather distinctive difficulties of Greece during this century.

PAPANDREOU: But...

BUCKLEY: You've had eight military coup d'etats in 50 years.

PAPANDREOU: Yes.

BUCKLEY: You've had an average change of government every year. You've had two civil wars. And under the circumstances, a lot of people seem to me to be rather resigned about the Greek experience, because what they're saying to themselves is, well, Hell, Greece can't have democracy any more than Spain apparently could, or Portugal. And I'm not saying this is true or it is not true, but I'm saying that this reasonably occurs to people who contemplate your history over 30 to 50 years.

PAPANDREOU: Allow me to make two statements. One

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is a correction of something I said myself.

BUCKLEY: Yes, sir.

PAPANDREOU: And then the other one is a response to your last very important question, or statement.

I like to be perfectly honest. And I would like to say that while my positions at the time were the ones that I have stated to you, following five years of bitter experience, when we have seen the West in the context of the NATO alliance, which was presumably established to defend self-determination, integrity, and democratic institutions -- that's the preamble of NATO -- when we see that this very organization has become the instrument of oppression in Greece, under the guidance of your Pentagon...

BUCKLEY: But you haven't made that plain.

PAPANDREOU: Allow me -- allow me to complete this, because you wanted me to answer properly...

BUCKLEY: Yes, absolutely.

PAPANDREOU: And now I shall.

BUCKLEY: Yes, and dwell on the instrument of oppression.

PAPANDREOU: Why not? It is. And I think of course we should dwell. But I won't repeat it too often...

BUCKLEY: Sure.

PAPANDREOU: ...because time is valuable. But not only in Greece, in Portugal, in Spain, in Turkey, in Iran -- and I'm talking about my part of the world, I'm leaving Brazil out of the way -- now, under those circumstances, when most of southern Europe is practically neofascist, when Italy may soon be -- General Vernon Walters is moving up to the second position in the CIA. Well, General Walters in 1961, November, in Italy, in a staff meeting of the U.S. embassy, said that if the socialists were to come close to power in Italy, the American troops in Italy and from Germany should occupy Italy.

BUCKLEY: Well, the socialists did come to power.

PAPANDREOU: And this I make a statement. No, but Mr. Walters was no longer in Italy.

BUCKLEY: And you think he would have brought the troops?

PAPANDREOU: As a matter of fact, I think it was very worthwhile for Congress to ask Mr. Walters today whether indeed

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he has repeated the statement now. It'd be very very important for Congress to find out what General Walters thinks about Italy today, and whether indeed in Italy a new putsch is not underway.

BUCKLEY: Managed by the CIA?

PAPANDREOU: Managed? Well, you know I get a bit lost, because for instance there is a man in Greece who played a very important role, Mr. Norbert Anschutz (?). He was the charge d'affaires. Actually I knew him very well. And I thought of him as a charge d'affaire. Now it turns out that he was a colonel in the U.S. Army, that's Pentagon. It turns out he is officially a top CIA agent. And now he turns out to be the manager of the First National Bank in Beirut. So you ask me is it the Pentagon, is it the First National Bank, is it the CIA, I just don't know.

BUCKLEY: You -- do you question the wisdom of our maintaining a Central Intelligence Agency?

PAPANDREOU: Not at all, sir. I do not. But I don't want it to manage my affairs.

BUCKLEY: Yes. Well, no...

PAPANDREOU: I want it to manage yours if you choose it.

BUCKLEY: Yes, yes.

PAPANDREOU: But not mine.

BUCKLEY: Well now, are you not -- or are you suggesting that Colonel Papadopoulos is an instrument of the CIA?

PAPANDREOU: Oh, but you see I happen to know this because it was my very bad luck that I became Minister of State and I was in charge of Greek intelligence. And I discovered to my very great surprise two things. Well, one thing. Namely that the Greek CIA, which -- that is, KYP, K-Y-P is the acronym -- was both fiscally and administratively an appendage of your CIA. Not surprising, because it was built after the civil war by the Office of Strategic Services, which preceded the CIA. But the thing that -- in fact, you know, that's why we couldn't stop them tapping our telephones. Which we tried, you know. I couldn't do that. But the thing that surprised me -- not surprised me, but the thing that I found out then, which had no significance to me then, any kind of significance -- it does now -- is that Papadopoulos was the official liason between the U.S. CIA and the Greek KYP.

And what we say in Greece now is that this is the first known CIA agent to become a Prime Minister of a European country. You know, this is what we say.

BUCKLEY: Well, I think it -- it seems to be going a little bit far to say that someone who's in charge of intelligence in a country which, God knows, needed an intelligence after the kind of civil war you went through, ended up simply being an agent of -- of the CIA. Mr. Papadopoulos...

PAPANDREOU: Well, he happened to be. He happened to be...

BUCKLEY: Mr. Papadopoulos was primarily...

PAPANDREOU: ...surely.

BUCKLEY: ...confused -- primarily condemned, in my experience with him, as being very provincial, being very...

PAPANDREOU: This I don't mind being provincial myself.

BUCKLEY: ...being very narrow minded, being exclusively concerned for his own country, and being a very unreliable ally in the sense that he would play with the Soviet Union even if necessary...

PAPANDREOU: He never would.

BUCKLEY: ...to establish...

PAPANDREOU: No, he never would. That is a little caramel that is distributed by the Pentagon to get funds for him. But the thing that also he was, and this is something that has been revealed in Congress, I did not know it for a fact myself, is that he was an agent of the SS during the Nazi occupation in Greece. And I think it is a rather important thing.

Nine members of the Greek junta were in the SS. And this is not my information. It is information produced in Washington for Washington's use.

BUCKLEY: I think probably, since I'm not in a position to...

PAPANDREOU: To deny this or confirm it.

BUCKLEY: I think I probably owe it to viewers here to say that your reliability has been questioned by some reviewers of your book who are not agents of the CIA. For instance in the New York Times. I don't intend anything personal by this. But they say that you are a very passionate man, and, as the New York Times man said, "oblivious of the fact that opposition accounts could be similarly plausible and persuasive". Or as another reviewer for Book World said, your book merely confirms that what in fact the Greek politics demonstrated, namely a strong disinclination to admit that there are other viewpoints,

other interests...

PAPANDREOU: Yes.

BUCKLEY: ...other truth than your own.

PAPANDREOU: Well, you see of course I am not going to judge myself. It is an impossibility.

BUCKLEY: Yes. It's awfully easy to say about Papadopoulos...

PAPANDREOU: No, no. You see...

BUCKLEY: ...that he was an ex-Nazi.

PAPANDREOU: No, no. You see -- no, no, but you see I didn't make a judgment.

BUCKLEY: Uh huh.

PAPANDREOU: No, no. I made a statement of fact. Something that you can confirm or disconfirm. And I stand to be corrected. I'm saying that your own Congress has evidence and your State Department. And it is official and hard information that he was in the SS during the Nazi occupation. And I say this as a statement of fact, not a belief.

BUCKLEY: Uh huh.

PAPANDREOU: Now if this is wrong, then I'm not wrong but those who have printed it in black and white, you know.

BUCKLEY: And you -- did you -- have long have you known this, have you had this information?

PAPANDREOU: About a month and a half to two months.

BUCKLEY: Yes.

PAPANDREOU: I did not know it before.

BUCKLEY: Now, what about -- what about the charge that's been leveled about you, since we're exchanging charges, do you...

PAPANDREOU: No, I'm not stating charges. I'm stating facts.

BUCKLEY: You're stating something that you have heard.

PAPANDREOU: Yes.

BUCKLEY: Presumably...

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PAPANDREOU: Well, no. Something that you can find out, too. Not hearsay. This is documentary evidence, available in the Capitol Hill.

BUCKLEY: Yes.

PAPANDREOU: I mean, you know, this is not hearsay.

BUCKLEY: Yes, well this is, of course, the way facts are always presented. It -- it's been said...

PAPANDREOU: Well, I'm sorry. I wasn't told that I should bring documents here.

BUCKLEY: No, that's all right. That's perfectly all right. We've -- we've had a lot of facts of this kind alleged. Ten years ago Life magazine published a charge that Stalin had been a member of the Okrona (?), and for all I know it was true. I don't think it greatly influenced Stalin towards pro-Czarism after 1917. And I certainly haven't seen any...

PAPANDREOU: Well, he was...

BUCKLEY: ...indications about...

PAPANDREOU: ...he was ready to become a priest, by the way, which...

BUCKLEY: Yes.

PAPANDREOU: ...must have meant at some point that he was part of the establishment in that country or trying to become a member of the establishment. So maybe it was...

BUCKLEY: Well, that -- that was really before the nationalization of religion in Russia.

PAPANDREOU: Yes.

BUCKLEY: But I haven't seen Papadopoulos urging a western dominated Nazi regime in Greece.

PAPANDREOU: Well, what is his regime? What is his regime? In fact he does urge exactly that. In fact if you do read all the editorials of his controlled press, they point an accusing finger at the Norwegians and the Danes and the Swedes. And they say Americans, look, these are not your friends because they are playing around in a coffee shop called democracy. What you need is law and order and responsibility and honest, loyal membership in NATO for the defense of the free world -- with concentration camps and torture chambers and prisons, things like that.

BUCKLEY: Yes, well, I think it's awfully true.

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or it's unfortunate (blank in broadcast) Papadopoulos seems to be a resurrection of something that probably Greeks have gotten awfully used to during this century. When Papadopoulos came out against Miniska oit recalled Pangalos (?) doing the same thing in 1924. When he called for national regeneration, it recalled Metaxis (?) doing that in the 30s.

I don't think unfortunately there's anything very new about Papadopoulos from anybody who views the situation a little bit more detachedly than you. By which I mean you were thrown out, and obviously this is bruising experience. Lots of people have been thrown out of Greece by the victor the eight military coups of the last 50 years.

Meanwhile you...

PAPANDREOU: What's the moral of that story?

BUCKLEY: ...want us to...

PAPANDREOU: What's the moral of that story?

BUCKLEY: The moral of that story is that you want us to reorient western policy in NATO in behalf of your feelings about Greece. And I'm trying to say to you that I can share, I hope quite sincerely, your disappointment about the antidemocratic nature of that regime without, however, feeling that they ought to impose on...

PAPANDREOU: Oh, heavens...

BUCKLEY: ...an alliance that has kept as much freedom as manages to survive in western Europe.

PAPANDREOU: Heaven forbid, no. The last thing I want is for you and the alliance to impose anything on Greece.

BUCKLEY: Uh huh.

PAPANDREOU: The most I want, the thing we all wish now in Greece, is that we be left alone to run our own home. We have lots of business in Greece...

BUCKLEY: Yes, but you have...

PAPANDREOU: We have -- allow me to finish, you see, unless you...

BUCKLEY: Sure. No, go ahead, go ahead, go ahead.

PAPANDREOU: Okay. We have much social reform to carry out in Greece. We want to bring democracy to every village. We want to build a Greece that really belongs to the Greeks and to the Greek youth. And I want to be left out of the Cold

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War strategic games that are ruining not only us but the world and you...

BUCKLEY: But you can't be.

PAPANDREOU: ...as well.

BUCKLEY: You can't be left out. You'd be gobbled up. .

PAPANDREOU: Well, look. What do you think we are now?

BUCKLEY: Well...

PAPANDREOU: We are gobbled up by the Pentagon right now.

(Both men talk at once)

BUCKLEY: I think, if I may say so, that's your superstition.

PAPANDREOU: If -- superstition?

BUCKLEY: Absolute superstition.

PAPANDREOU: Let me give you some facts, sir.

BUCKLEY: Okay.

PAPANDREOU: W. W. Rostow, February 1967, subcommittee of the Security Council of the United States, reviewed the Greek situation. Conclusion: the Center Union and Papandreous will win in May '67.

BUCKLEY: Oh, I -- everybody agrees...

PAPANDREOU: That being...

BUCKLEY: Sure. Everybody knows that.

PAPANDREOU: ...against the interest of the United States, proceeds Mr. Rostow, therefore necessary to move toward a dictatorial solution in Greece. Source, because you like sources: Marquis Childs' syndicated column, plus oral confirmation by Marquis Childs to me in person, Spring 1968. Available in print.

BUCKLEY: To say that Marquis Childs said it doesn't mean that it's true. But...

PAPANDREOU: All right.

BUCKLEY: ...but let's -- let's oblige it...
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PAPANDREOU: All right. Next...

BUCKLEY: Go ahead.

PAPANDREOU: ...who made the coup in Greece? Five men. I can reel off their names. It don't make much sense; Greek names are difficult to pronounce if you're not a Greek. But the five men -- I'll reel them off -- Papadopoulos, Makarezos (?), Patakos (?), Hadzipatro (?), Foralis (?). This is the group.

Of the five, the four members of the Greek intelligence agency. Therefore of the five, the four members necessarily and inevitably of the CIA. The coup was a CIA coup. And it was a Pentagon supported one.

We hope that by next fall an army officer who has escaped the junta to which he belonged -- we hope, I say -- will be secure enough abroad to be able to give testimony to personal participation in Greek uniform of CIA personnel, as in Cambodia and as in Laos.

By the way, it might be of interest to you that the overthrow -- the officers who overthrew Sihanouk in Cambodia were trained in Greece by Papadopoulos. Just as you may be interested to know that the Italian neofascists, the MSE in Italy, is getting today its guidance by the junta. And there is now documentary evidence of this in Italy.

The famous general who tried the coup a little while back -- not general but prince, in fact, Borgese (?), Borgese is now in Corfu, working very closely with the Greek junta and preparing the next few moves in Italy.

So we're talking about a pattern here...

BUCKLEY: Mr. Papandreou, I wish -- I wish that the CIA were one half as powerful as you depict it as being. We would have much less difficulty throughout the world.

I do know that Papadopoulos was investigated as far back as 1958 because it was suspected that he was involved in a coup. I also know that there are coups in Greece before CIA was invented.

PAPANDREOU: Yes.

BUCKLEY: It's the obvious, it's the ordinary thing in Greece...

PAPANDREOU: The ordinary?

BUCKLEY: ...not the extraordinary thing.

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PAPANDREOU: Oh, no.

BUCKLEY: They've been going on in Latin America for 150 years before we -- before we discovered the existence of Latin America.

PAPANDREOU: Allow me to disagree with you. We can disagree, can't we?

BUCKLEY: Sure.

PAPANDREOU: Are you -- are you suggesting that the present Brazilian dictatorship, for instance, is independent of the policies pursued by the Pentagon and the CIA?

BUCKLEY: Of course I...

PAPANDREOU: Are you suggesting that...

BUCKLEY: It's highly...

PAPANDREOU: ...the IT&T, for instance...

BUCKLEY: It's highly...

PAPANDREOU: ...would not have been involved with the CIA in the overthrow of Allende? Yes or no?

BUCKLEY: Mr. Papandreou, if you think this is a dilemma, you have something...

PAPANDREOU: No. I want your answer.

BUCKLEY: It's -- it's -- it's obviously true that there are identities of interest throughout the world. Here you're about to participate in a great big rally in New York in which...

PAPANDREOU: Yes.

BUCKLEY: ...you urge action in behalf of policies that you desire. Now, there's no reason in the world why other people don't -- and in fact they do -- urge action in behalf of policies...

PAPANDREOU: Oh, this I understand.

BUCKLEY: ...that they desire.

PAPANDREOU: This I understand.

~~BUCKLEY: But the hobgoblinization of international politics on grounds of the old canard that the CIA runs everything is unfortunately an undeserved tribute to CIA. If -- if --~~

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~~if they could keep us out of that trouble we wouldn't have had things like the Vietnam war to worry about.~~

PAPANDREOU: Well, they got you there. But they miscalculated. You see, there are also more...

BUCKLEY: It's a sort of a Birchite notion in which CIA is the villain rather than...

~~PAPANDREOU: No. It is not. I don't believe really CIA is the villain. CIA is the instrument.~~

BUCKLEY: Yes.

PAPANDREOU: You have to look much deeper for the villain.

BUCKLEY: Well, maybe the villain is the 20th Century superstition that democracy is the natural thing. People talk about Greece being the cradle of democracy. There's been very little democracy in Greece. Isn't that true?

PAPANDREOU: Let me ask you a question.

BUCKLEY: Plato's -- Plato's democracy was based on slaves.

PAPANDREOU: Are you prepared to lose your freedoms here, Mister...

BUCKLEY: No. I'm prepared to...

PAPANDREOU: Are you prepared to lose them?

BUCKLEY: I'm prepared to indulge a military-industrial complex in order to...

PAPANDREOU: Yes.

BUCKLEY: ...maintain those freedoms.

PAPANDREOU: Yes. And are you prepared, however, are you prepared yourself to see any reduction of your freedoms in this country? Suppose that there is some group that calls for it. What would your stand be? I'd really be interested...

BUCKLEY: I'd ask them what they were talking about.

PAPANDREOU: Uh huh.

BUCKLEY: I was inducted into the army in 1950 -- '43, which was certainly a loss of my freedom.

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BUCKLEY: On the other hand, I understood this as a necessary corporate effort at the time.

PAPANDREOU: Well, I volunteered in your navy because I wanted to fight the Nazis.

BUCKLEY: Yes.

PAPANDREOU: And I seem to be doing this sort of thing all my life, one way or another. But this time it is not the Nazis, it's the Pentagonists.

BUCKLEY: I know. But there are also people who say that you screwed things up...

PAPANDREOU: Oh, look...

BUCKLEY: ...when you went back to Greece.

PAPANDREOU: ...I am not claiming that I have been successful.

BUCKLEY: Yes.

PAPANDREOU: The only thing I might claim is that I believe in freedom and human dignity.

BUCKLEY: Well, do you believe that the United States...

PAPANDREOU: And I'm working for it.

BUCKLEY: Do you believe that the United States -- let me ask you a generic question now...

PAPANDREOU: Yes.

BUCKLEY: ...should refuse to transact at all with any country that suppresses parliamentary democracy?

PAPANDREOU: No, sir.

BUCKLEY: Uh huh.

PAPANDREOU: If you ask me now put yourself, you mean, in an American...

BUCKLEY: Sure.

PAPANDREOU: ...statesman's shoes...

BUCKLEY: Sure.

PAPANDREOU: Okay. For that role I would define what I would do. I would surely not do what you have suggested.

If in the interests of the nation, this collectivity that you call the United States of America, it is essential that we maintain -- you maintain -- good relations with the China, the Soviet Union, that is fine. On the other hand, if you yourself are the key member, the senior member, of an alliance, the first rule that should be observed is that you respect the member nations that have joined your alliance to defend their own freedoms and their own integrity, national integrity. And what I charge and charge vigorously is that within this alliance either you accepted or you have imposed on some of them very oppressive militaristic regimes. And I have mentioned five in my part of the world. There are many more. But I'm talking about NATO. And Iran will soon, I think, be in NATO.

To add something else, I would consider that it is very poor politics to attempt to export the American way of life in Vietnam at the cost of defoliation and really what amounts to genocide. I consider that these policies are inconsistent with human survival. And I would not espouse them. But I would not limit the freedom of an American to make deals in a peaceful context for the maintenance of world stability. Of course not.

BUCKLEY: Well, do you think that we were wrong in lending American military force to help you repress the communist civil war? Should we have said, "No. Look after yourself"?

PAPANDREOU: I think on this question, Mr. Buckley, you'll find that most Greeks would say that you were not wrong, that you were right.

BUCKLEY: Including yourself?

PAPANDREOU: I would say -- I would have definitely said yes until the thing that you built, which was parliamentary processes that you permitted to survive, you destroyed yourselves.

BUCKLEY: Uh huh.

PAPANDREOU: On the night of April 21. Because if I am offered the choice between one tyrant or another, I can make no choice. I can make no choice. We choose freedom.

And I can say this with Senator Fulbright, with Senator Fulbright, that the Truman Doctrine after 25 years of Cold War and intervention on a global scale looks much different today than it looked on the day when President Truman, March 12th '47, announced to Congress that the U.S. had to support the Greek government to defend its existence and its institutions, the freedom, self-determination and freedom, and democratic institutions. Had this been more than just a slogan by now I would respect it to date. But it has become a tinny slogan.

BUCKLEY: Right. Now, what -- what -- how do you account for King Constantine's refusal to back your movement

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in Greece? Or Karamanlis's refusals? Which leaves you as a rather exposed member of the Greek left with the only ally being the communists.

PAPANDREOU: Well, I am not sure that even the communists are allies. But you see I do not consider that looking at the leadership and saying, you know, who is collaborating with whom, that this really tells much of a story. The important thing is what's happening to the Greek people, where do the Greek people, the anonymous Greek people, the farmers, the workers, the youth, where do they stand. And I say to you...

BUCKLEY: Well, when the king asked them to rise up against the colonels not one of them did.

PAPANDREOU: Not surprising. I wouldn't have either.

BUCKLEY: Why?

PAPANDREOU: Because the king, you see, prepared a coup himself. And everybody knew that. So why choose king's coup versus colonels' coup? You know.

BUCKLEY: Well, is the king a CIA agent also?

PAPANDREOU: No. He is not.

BUCKLEY: Wouldn't that be better, to have a non-CIA coup?

PAPANDREOU: Yes, well -- it doesn't mean that the king doesn't lend a very friendly ear. But what I meant to say: he was not an agent in the technical sense, which Papadopoulos is.

I don't know why I should prefer a non-CIA dictatorship to a CIA dictatorship. They're all the same. The only thing I'm arguing is that this did happen to be instigated by the CIA.

BUCKLEY: You -- you have in the book that when you were taken to prison...

PAPANDREOU: Yes.

? | BUCKLEY: ...that the king argued very strongly against your being executed. But you say that the person who really kept you from being executed was Lyndon Johnson. And you quote him as saying, "I just told those Greek bastards to lay off that son of a bitch, whatever his name is". Now...

PAPANDREOU: This is what Galbraith told me Johnson said.

BUCKLEY: Uh huh. Now, did you imply by that that Lyndon Johnson controlled the movements of the colonels...

PAPANDREOU: Yes, yes.

BUCKLEY: ...or that it was just his prestige?

PAPANDREOU: Oh, no. He controlled them.

BUCKLEY: Did he call them "Greek bastards", people he controlled?

PAPANDREOU: Well, I expect that knowing the quality of the people they are probably he would in private.

(Audience laughter)

BUCKLEY: I see. I see.

PAPANDREOU: But he can use them.

BUCKLEY: Yes.

PAPANDREOU: You know, you can use a gang to do your job but you don't have to respect them for it.

~~BUCKLEY: So there's a sense in which you owe your life to the fact that it was CIA agents who did the coup?~~

PAPANDREOU: By the way, it could be true. And as a matter of fact, trying to be as proper as I can, after I got out of jail I went to see Philip Starboard and to ask Philip Starboard to convey to President Johnson, with whom I disagree profoundly, on the Greek issue and many others, to convey to him my personal thanks...

BUCKLEY: Right.

PAPANDREOU: ...for the fact that he really did save my life.

Actually the people I owe it to is the American economics profession and other -- you know, the American Economic Association, united and without one abstention, went to the President -- I mean communicated to the President. Paul Samuelson, Galbraith, Walter Heller, and so forth. And so morally they are the ones I am thanking. But in fact were it not for Johnson's intervention I wouldn't be here on your show today.

BUCKLEY: Or King Constantine.

PAPANDREOU: Well, I don't know what his power was at the time.

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BUCKLEY: Mr. Bellos.

MR. BELLOS: I'd like to ask a question as a Greek. You are very anti-monarchist. Why is it so?

PAPANDREOU: For one thing, Mr. Bellos, for the reason that I just gave, that on May 13th '67 King Constantine was planning a coup himself. He was beaten to the punch by the colonels. And I have no reason to believe that his coup would have been any softer or less repressive. That would be reason enough for me.

But more importantly -- and I shall even forget the errors of the past -- I shall say that one of the things that has condemned King Constantinos to the Greek people is that he has been silent since the day that he got out of Greece. He draws a salary from the colonels. He does not say that he is with them or against them. He allows some people to think that he is against them and others that he is with them. He is living off their budget.

BELLOS: Yes, but you were against the king way before...

PAPANDREOU: Oh, yes.

BELLOS: ...the coup happened.

PAPANDREOU: Oh, yes.

BELLOS: Well, don't you think that the king is a very stable influence to Greek politics.

PAPANDREOU: Well, how stable is he? Did you see what happened with his presence?

BELLOS: Well, isn't that because of the Espiza (?) affair that in July '65 happened?

PAPANDREOU: Well, would you tell us about it, because I think...

BELLOS: Why don't you tell us about it?

PAPANDREOU: Well, I'd like to know...

BUCKLEY: There are a couple of versions.

PAPANDREOU: ...what you mean by the Espiza affair.

BELLOS: Well, I'd like you because you were there. Won't you tell me about it? You were at the time investigator of the affair -- I mean you were the main action in the affair. Why don't you tell me about it?

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PAPANDREOU: Was I the main action?

BELLOS: That's what the people say.

PAPANDREOU: What people?

BELLOS: That's what the reports say.

PAPANDREOU: Which reports?

BELLOS: Before the coup.

PAPANDREOU: Which reports?

BELLOS: Before the coup.

PAPANDREOU: Yes, but which reports, not when.

BUCKLEY: I'll tell you who said it.

PAPANDREOU: Okay. Let's get down to facts.

BUCKLEY: I don't actually...

BELLOS: Isn't it the (word indistinguishable) and it's some part of the...

PAPANDREOU: Well, I can make it easier for you. I was charged on the 10th of May. The coup was April 21. And on the 10th of May I was taken over to a criminal prison and put in solitary confinement for eight months awaiting trial for what they call high treason. High treason because I was supposed to have been in cahoots and in some sense the political inspirator and leader of a group of what are called leftist officers -- I think about 27 in number, junior officers -- to take over the country, oust the king, establish a Nasser-like heinous dictatorship in Greece. This is the way the charge read, and I'm perfectly willing to tell you what the charge said. And I waited quite eagerly for the day that this trial would take place. We all did.

The basis of this accusation was beyond the kind of hearsay that is quite standard under dictatorial regimes. The personal depositions of two people, whose names -- well, one of them was called Bakviotis (?), it does not matter -- who had said that they had heard me say, and this was where the whole case rested, that at some point these two people arrived in Washington, D.C. here and called a press conference and told your people and the world that they had been intimidated and threatened to make these declarations, following which there was no case. And that is why no trial was held. Apart from the very very funny thing, you know, that for a military gang that takes over a country and destroys its freedom to say that it will try you because you thought -- in quotes, maybe you did, huh? -- you thought of doing something. I don't know.

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BUCKLEY: Which they succeeded in doing.

PAPANDREOU: It is really very funny. Pardon?

BUCKLEY: Which they succeeded in doing.

PAPANDREOU: Which they succeeded in doing, and which I didn't have any reason to do for a simple reason, Mr. Buckley.

BUCKLEY: That you were going to come by more than...

PAPANDREOU: We had 53 percent of the people. Why should you -- really, even if you are a very ambitious man and a very arrogant man, why should you go by the force of arms when you have the popular vote? I mean, minorities do that, not majorities.

BELLOS: Yes, but let me ask you a question too.

PAPANDREOU: What did I need the army for?

BELLOS: Well, talking about the king again, which was my first question, why has your father never mentioned anything about monarchy? And why did you have that, you know, misunderstanding between you and your father about the monarchy?

PAPANDREOU: Well, my father mentioned many things about the monarchy. In fact he was not a specially close friend of Constantine, as you do know.

BELLOS: Uh huh.

PAPANDREOU: He raised the famous slogan in Greece, which is part of our life now: "the King rules and the people govern". And that was a charge. Our disagreement with my father was entirely tactical as to whether we should vote for a caretaker government or not. And that was not an issue of principle.

BUCKLEY: Mr. Stevenson.

PAPANDREOU: It was a practical matter.

MR. STEVENSON: I wanted to get back to the question of what should be the proper basis for the U.S. relations with Greece. You obviously want to turn off -- want us to turn off the military tap...

PAPANDREOU: That's right.

STEVENSON: ...and presumably disestablish whatever CIA organization we have there. How much further would you go? What about American private industry, the other aspects of America's involvement?

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PAPANDREOU: Well, I think the -- I think the one key recommendation I have is to respect the will of the Greek people. That is to say, to make it possible by withdrawing support for this regime for the Greek people to hold elections, free and uninterfered with, not the kind of elections Thieu held some time ago in South Vietnam, but honest elections. And let them, the Greek people, through their elected representatives, whatever they may be -- and I may not be one of them, who knows? The Greek people may not wish me to be their representative. Let those representatives negotiate with you on what kind of relations they wish to have, military and economic.

STEVENSON: But the sequence of events is simply turn off the military tap, that will bring about elections, which will somehow...

PAPANDREOU: Not necessarily.

STEVENSON: ...reflect the will of the people.

PAPANDREOU: I cannot give you the scenario. I wish I knew enough to be able to give you the scenario. As my father used to say, entrance to this arena of a dictatorship is very easy, the ticket is easy to buy; exit is very difficult. And I do not think it is easy to get out of the mess. And all I say that the U.S. can do now is disengage itself and let the Greeks take care of their problems. I don't ask that you supervise any transition period. That -- I don't even want that kind of patronizing. I would wish that you would cut off relations with this regime that is a shame, a shame to European traditions and life as the Council of Europe has established by ousting the Greek junta from its ranks, and that you leave us alone to find our way. And then you deal on equal terms, morally equal terms, with the elected representatives of that people. That's what I am recommending.

Is it difficult to buy that?

BUCKLEY: Mr. Hackett.

MR. HACKETT: Mr. Papandreou, last year in a statement that you sent to one of your political groups at a Vienna meeting in November, I believe...

PAPANDREOU: That's right.

HACKETT: ...you wrote, in describing the political situation as you saw it after the junta "Greece will be a neutral country with respect to Cold War blocs. Socialist, not simply socialist-democratic, a democracy in the context of a socialist community which surpasses the petrified parliamentary type". If that's the point of...

PAPANDREOU: It's not the best translation, but...
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HACKETT: If that's the point of agreement between you and Mr. Buckley, that you both seem to look back with some doubts about Greek's (sic) parliamentary past, what -- what do you see in a post-junta...

PAPANDREOU: No. A very good question. You see, I -- that phrase does not imply that I am against parliamentary government. It does imply that I consider it inadequate by itself. Specifically -- that was a very short letter, and the time now is short -- I also believe in very substantial regionalization of Greece, 11 regions. And I believe there should be substantial autonomy in social and economic policy and direct participation of the people of the region in the decisions that concern them. I want to decentralize decision-making in Greece. I want Athens to be played down. And I want the village to be played up. And this is really the thing -- not that deputies won't be elected to a national parliament, but many decisions won't be for the central government, will be for the regional government.

As for the first, it is true, Mr. Hackett, that after so many years, after the confirmation that NATO really intends to keep the colonels in power, we have no choice as honest men but to say we want out of that. But so do we also want out of any military alliance that suppresses our freedom. So our condemnation is at least as strong with respect to the Warsaw Pact, which has the Hungarys and the Czechoslovakias in its history.

We want to live in peace and in freedom. And NATO, far from guaranteeing that, has deprived us of both.

BUCKLEY: Mr. Bellos.

BELLOS: Well, talking about -- you said the province and the islands, don't you think that out of Athens they are more conservative people than what Athens is?

PAPANDREOU: No, sir. Quite to the contrary, I think the Greek villager is the most progressive force in Greece.

BELLOS: Don't you think that the Greek -- coming back to my question, I think the Greek villager wants a king and a church.

PAPANDREOU: Why did they vote 53 percent for us? Don't think it was Athens that gave us the vote. Athens voted either for the right or for the communists. We got our votes in the Greek village. And this is our strength and this is our base.

I quite disagree with the reports about the conservative Greek of the village. He's a magnificently wise and committed man. And if he has not moved into action it's because organizationally the framework has not been provided for that.

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BUCKLEY: Mr. Stevenson.

STEVENSON: How is the United States supposed to know that the will of the Greek people has been exercised? In a lot of countries the way elections are held can be controlled -- perhaps even in the past, because of the involvement of outside powers, elections have been rigged somewhat.

PAPANDREOU: Quite true.

STEVENSON: How do we know?

PAPANDREOU: Quite true. And I would even wish to put the burden on the United States to supervise elections, because that already gives it too much influence on what happens in Greece.

STEVENSON: Should it be...

PAPANDREOU: I would prefer...

STEVENSON: ...another non-Greek state?

PAPANDREOU: I would prefer -- I would prefer a United Nations commission.

STEVENSON: You would?

PAPANDREOU: A United Nations commission to supervise elections in Greece. And I would like them to be supervised. And I suppose that if a United Nations commission were to do that, you would be willing to accept its findings. Or not?

BUCKLEY: Well, would you -- would you get members of the United Nations that were practiced in democracy?

PAPANDREOU: I am afraid that the United Nations on the whole is not too practiced.

BUCKLEY: Uh huh. You can find a few.

PAPANDREOU: But you know one has to reach for something. And I think the only thing that remains somewhat respectable as an instrumentality is the United Nations.

I say only somewhat respectable because it doesn't have teeth, because it includes everything, pretty much, or almost everything under the sun. But there is one advantage in the United Nations: that all the forces are represented. And if you have a unanimous report by some commission that the elections were honest, I'm willing to buy it.

BUCKLEY: Even if it returned the colonels to power?

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PAPANDREOU: I'm willing to accept anything the Greek people wish.

BUCKLEY: Really?

PAPANDREOU: Yes, I am.

BUCKLEY: I thought you said you were above all in favor of freedom?

PAPANDREOU: Yes. But that is freedom.

BUCKLEY: You surely wouldn't -- wouldn't -- you...

PAPANDREOU: Ah.

BUCKLEY: ...surely wouldn't go against freedom simply because the majority wanted...

PAPANDREOU: All right.

BUCKLEY: ...to be without it, would you?

PAPANDREOU: All right. You ask a very fundamental, of course, philosophical question.

BUCKLEY: Yes. We have only 15 seconds for this question.

PAPANDREOU: Okay. My answer -- (laughter) all right. That was very smart of you. Yes, I think there is a contradiction in the democratic process that we have the freedom to kill freedom. And I don't think anybody's resolved that, and I'm surely not going to.

BUCKLEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Papandreo, and ladies -- gentlemen of the panel, ladies and gentlemen.